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In the 1980s, few agricultural economists,
pmticularly from the Southern Region, published
works on international trade or the globalization of
the world economy. The initiation of the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) in 1986 stimulated such writings as
the Southern Agriculture in a World Economy series
by the Southern Region Extension International
Trade Task Force (Rosson et al.). An even smaller
number of agricultural economists were writing on
policy linkages between trade and the environment.
An early effort to remedy this situation was the
Workshop on Linkages between Natural Resources
and International Trade in Agricultural Commodities
(Sutton).
Now in the mid 1990s, it has become clear
that the U.S. economy is an integrat part of a larger
world economy, The recent passage by Congress of
the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) was certainly one of the major news
events in 1993. NAFTA marked the first time that
economies as divergent as those of the U.S. and
Mexico formed a free trade area (FTA). It was also
the fwst international agreement that explicitly
linked the reduction of trade barriers to
environmental issues.
Throughout the postwar wWII) period
until the 1980s, the U.S. was one of the
staunchest supporters of multilateralism, or the
global integration of the world economy. In the
1980s, however, the U.S. changed its position
towards regionaiization in both the geographical and
preferential senses (Bhagwati 1992). At the same
time, environmentaJ groups, through politicaf action
committees, gained influence in Congress.
Accordingly, the U.S. has become much more likely
to link trade with environmental issues through
bilateral or regionaf agreements.
This paper attempts to apply economic
rationale to the issues of muJtilateralism,
regionalization, and environmental concerns. It is a
traditional Neo-classical approach, which attempts
to utilize existing economic knowledge on these
topics to conceptualize and address these issues.
We begin with a brief discussion of the merits of
multilateralism versus regionalization and how the
two might cause differences in environmental
quality. This is followed by a discussion of the
issues involved in linking trade with environmental
policy. Comments are then made on externalities
and distortions. Views are then offered concerning
the increased willingness of countries such as the
U.S. to influence behavior in other countries
through trade policies or sanctions. We then
comment on pollution source and make suggestions
concerning payment. Finally, a southern perspective
on trade and environmental issues is offered along
with concluding remarks,
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GATT or NAFTA: Does It Matter?
Congress passed NAFTA in November
1993, and by December a GATT agreement was
reached. Previously, the U.S. was among the
world’s strongest supporters of GAIT and its
nondiscriminatory, multilateral trade philosophy.
However, in the late 1980s and 1990s the U.S.
actively sought to form inherently discriminatory
integration arrangements such as the Canadian-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA (Bhagwati
1992; Preeg; Sung). Earlier in the 1980s the U.S.
formed an FTA with Israel and unilaterally granted
preferential treatment to selected Caribbean Basin
countries (Fairchild et al.). Questions arise as to
why the U.S. shifted its policy toward FTAs and
what effects this policy shift will have on the
environment.
It is generally accepted that the initial shift
in U.S. policy towards bilateral and regional trade
agreements was a reaction to counter the reluctance
of the former European Community, now the
European Union (EU), to negotiate the lowering of
trade barriers, especially in agriculture and services
(e.g., Bhagwati 1992; Ow-Taylor; Young). In
essence, negotiating NAFTA was originally a
political tactic designed to force the EU to negotiate
in the Uraguay round of GATT.
The formation of NAFTA to counter the
EU leads one to ask whether the world’s
environment will benefit more from a trading
system based on multilateral agreements that
espouse free trade as the ultimate goal, or one based
on regional trading blocs? It is our opinion that
multilateral agreements based on the Most Favored
Nation (MFN) principle (Article I of GATT) will
lead to a more efficient allocation of resources and
a higher quality world-wide environment than will
regional blocs. The MFN principle insures that
trade among member nations is nondiscriminatory
because it requires tariffs on any particular
commodity to be the same and independent of
source.
One might ask why we hold this opinion
when FTAs and Custom Unions (CUS), many of
which are sanctioned under Article XXIV of GATT,
also lead to freer trade albeit among members. The
main reason is that FTAs and CUS discriminate
against nonmembers and violate GAIT’s MFN
principle, Al!hough FTAs and CUS lower tariff
barriers and lead to trade creation (increased wade)
among members, they divert trade because tariff
rates on goods from nonmembers are now higher
than those on members’ goods (Meade; Viner).
Trade creation is usually considered
welfare enhancing while trade diversion is
considered welfare reducing because of effects on
resource use. Trade creation increases welfare
because the FTA or CU encourages members to
produce according to their comparative advantages
relative to other members. Thus, inefficiently
produced domestic goods within the CU or FTA are
replaced by goods produced more efficiently by
other members. However, the reallocation of
resources based on comparative advantage is only
partial, because higher tariff rates applied to
nonmembers divert trade away from lower-cost
nonmember goods to higher-cost member
production. Whether or not world welfare is
increased or decreased depends on whether trade
creation is greater than or less than trade diversion.
According to Meade, economic welfare would most
likely increase if the partner countries are similar
and competitive but potentially complementary or
dissimilar.
When trade diversion outweighs trade
creation, world welfare and the environment are less
well off than before integration. Trade is diverted
away from lower-cost production and replaced by
higher-cost production, and therefore more resources
are consumed in the production process. Even
when trade creation outweighs trade diversion,
resources are wasted compared to the free trade
situation where all trade and production is based on
comparative advantage. Production based on
comparative advantage can increase output for a
given amount of resources (Kreinin).
Another issue concerning trading blocks,
including CUS and FTAs, is whether or not they
inherently lead to and increase the pace towards
multilateral free trade. This has become an
important issue given the proliferation of trading
blocks in most regions, including North and South
America, Europe and Asia. Some argue that
regional trading blocks are a step in the right
direction towards world-wide free trade based on
the ideas that a trade block is better than nothing,
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multilateral free trade (e.g., Deardorffi Namkung;
Schott), Others, including ourselves, would argue
that trading blocks do not necessarily lead to or
increase the pace towards multilateml free trade
(e.g., Bhagwati 1992; Kim; Ow-TayloC Sung).
First, we believe that trade diversion impacts are not
fully considered. Second, we feel that regionalism
may divert attention from multilateralism and thus
actually slow the movement towards a more open
global trading system. If the process is slowed,
then resource-wasting production remains in place
longer than without the trading block, and
environmental degradation is exacerbated when
compared to multilateral trade agreements leading to
free trade. Certainly, this is an area which deserves
further analysis.
To close this section we want to briefly
mention the possible political, nontrade effects of
regionalism versus globalism. Whether regional or
global agreements on trade are reached, neither
seem to preclude purely environmental agreements
that may be either good or bad. One might argue
that proximity and bilateralism may make
environmental agreements more feasible. For
example, during the NAFTA negotiations, the U.S.
made it clear that pollution on the U.S.-Mexico
border was unacceptable. Less mention of air
pollution in Mexico City was made. On the other
side, global agreements on the environment might
minimize the probability of a more powerful county
dictating environmental regulations that are based on
its income level and values but are inefficient and
suboptimal based on the other country’s income and
values. It would also seem to lessen a country’s
ability to use environmental issues as a means to
justify protectionism. We will return to these
issues.
Trade, Growth, and the Environment
Environmental action groups are
increasingly insisting that international trade be
linked with environmental regulations. Often they
insist that trade policy be used to influence the
behavior of other sovereign nations concerning
pollution, food safety, and resource use, Potentially,
this view can be extremely disruptive to world trade
and can actually lead to a worsening of the
environment.
Certain economists (e.g., Brown; Ritchie;
Shrybman), as well as environmental action groups,
consider international trade to be ecologically
harmful and undesirable. Some (e.g., Daly) also
believe that if all countries were self-sufficient, the
environment and the utilization of natural resources
would be improved relative to a world with a more
open flow of traded goods. Most economists would
consider this view to be incorrect. One assumption
often made is that trade tends to increase production
(correct) which aIways leads to increased pollution
and environmental damage (incorrect). If this view
were correct, any impetus to growth, whether via
increased trade or domestic demand, would lead to
a worsening of the environment.
First, let us consider the effects of growth
on the environment. Evidence seems to suggest that
as a poor country initially increases its production,
pollution increases, but as incomes rise, pollution
eventually decreases (Grossman and Krueger). The
reason is that, in an economic sense, environmental
quality is a luxury good. Therefore, as nations
become richer they have the means and are willing
to spend more on environmental quality.
If environmental quality is a luxury good,
then we would not expect all countries to desire or
choose the same level of environmental quality.
Poor countries would rationally be willing to accept
more pollution than richer countries. Coercing all
countries to institute identical environmental
regulations would actually be distorting and would
diminish world welfare.
Another reason why certain countries are
more willing to increase pollution is that their
environment may have a greater capacity to
assimilate the pollution than the environment in
other countries (Butler), The same argument holds
for regions within the U.S. An example is the case
of dairy production in the Southwestern U.S. and in
South Florida. In South Florida, large diary herds
exist on the north shore of Lake Okeechobee, and
there is mounting evidence that they m the largest
contributor to pollution in the lake. If the pollution
is unabated, it could lead to the death of the lake.
The Southwestern U.S. (e.g., New Mexico and West
Texas) with a much different environment and
aquifer system can better absorb the waste from
dairies than can South Florida, and with less harm
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from South Florida to the Southwestern U.S. has the
potential to increase overall environmental quality,
Next, consider the view that self
sufficiency in production and consumption leads to
a more benign impact on the environment than does
free trade. It is relatively easy to refute this view
both theoretically and empirically. The most
attractive result of ffee trade is that production is
allocated among nations according to each country’s
comparative advantage. By reallocating resource-
use to meet this end, the world can produce more
goods with the same amount of resource use. Thus,
free trade relative to self-sufficiency is resource
saving, Effectively, self sufficiency policies lead to
inefficient use of resources and cause unnecessary
resource waste in the production of a given quantity
of goods. Empirically, evidence seems to support
the hypothesis that countries with open economies
in terms of trade have cleaner industries and higher
environmental standards than countries with more
closed or self-sufficient economies (Birdsall and
Wheeler; Wheeler and Martin). Countries with
extremely closed economies such as Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union have much worse, not
better, environments than countries embracing freer
trade.
Externalities and Distortions
Externalities exist and are often found in
markets for natural resources used as inputs into
production or in pollution from production
processes. This is generally the case when property
rights to natural resources are not specifically
assigned. If so, the private cost of production or
consumption can be less than social cost, and some
type of action is warranted to equate the two costs.
A discussion of externalities quickly takes
us into the realm of distortions and the theory of
second best, an area well represented in the
international trade literature (e.g., Bhagwati 1971;
Johnson), The message of this literature is that the
first-best solution to a distomion or externality is to
go directly to the sector of the economy where the
externality or distortion exists and to equate
marginal private costs to marginal social costs via a
tax-cum-subsidy. For example, if an externality
exists such that an industry pollutes more than what
is considered socially optimal, the industry should
be taxed according to its pollution level until the
socially optimum level of pollution is reached.
Alternatively, the industry could be subsidized to
reduce pollution to the socially optimum level. A
production tax-cum-subsidy on output would be
suboptimal in this case and second best. It would
distort production. A third-best solution would be
to use trade policy to address the problem. For
example, an import tariff or export tax would distort
prices not only in the production sector but also in
the consumption sector (Bhagwati 1971). Thus, if
an industry in a country pollutes the environment
more than what is desirable, the application of trade
instruments by that country or trade sanctions by
other countries is certainly not the most efficient
method to correct the problem.
When a distortion or externality exists in
the production sector, the first-best policy is a tax-
cum-subsidy on output. If the output of a product
is subsidized, output would be greater than optimal
and so would any pollution generated from the
production process even if the private cost of
pollution were equated to its social cost (i.e. no
distortions or externalities in the elimination of
waste). It might be tempting in this case to tax
pollution instead of removing the production
subsidy, but this would be second best because it
would cause the private cost of polluting to be
greater than its social costs, and the distortion to
production would still exist.
In the case of diary production in the U.S.,
the government subsidizes output which leads to
over production and additional pollution. Consider
the dairy industry in South Florida. Although
improbable, it is possible that diary producers are
paying the social cost of eliminating their waste.
However, since their production is subsidized, they
produce beyond the optimal level. Thus, pollution
is greater than it would be without the subsidy.
Some environmental groups and regulatory bodies
would be inclined to address the problem by taxing
pollution or by regulating pollution, This would not
address the distortion in production. Furthermore,
if the cost of waste elimination were correctly
priced, it would add another distortion into the
system. The appropriate policy would be to remove
the production subsidy.
When an externality exists in factor
markets, the appropriate and fwst-best policy is to
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societal perspective, if timber is under priced and
thus over utilized by the furniture industry, a
government could place a tax on timber or it could
use a subsidy to pay producers to use timber
optimally and efficiently. Taxing the output of
furniture would lower timber usage, but it would be
a second-best policy because it does not correct the
factor market distortion, and it introduces a new
distortion in the production of furniture. A third-
best solution would be for the government to place
an export tax on furniture. Now consider whether
a self-sufficiency policy through import tariffs
would reduce timber, usage and remove the
externality, Under certain conditions it could lower
timber usage in a particular country. But even if it
did, it would be a third-best policy because it
introduces new distortions in both the production
and consumption sectors and does not remove the
externality in the timber market.
To see this, consider a small country which
exports and imports different types of furniture. If
it were to levy import tariffs to pursue a self-
sufficiency policy, the domestic price of furniture
would rise relative to its export price, since it
cannot affect world prices. Producers would have
an incentive to shift resources away from producing
export furniture and to the production of more
furniture for the domestic market. Consumers
would lose and producers would gain. However,
resources would not be used efficiently because the
externality in the timber market would still exist,
Secondly, producers shift out of more efficient,
export production (production based on compmative
advantage) towards production of furniture for the
domestic market in which it has a comparative
disadvantage.
If the country were fully employed, the
self-sufficiency policy not only fails to correct the
factor market externality but also causes production
of inefficient, resource-wasting industries to
increase. Furniture exports and their foreign
exchange earnings would decline, and there would
be intense pressure to overvalue the country’s
currency, further discouraging furniture exports and
encouraging import substitution. If the country
were not fully employed, the self-sufficiency policy
might have little effect on export production but
would increase furniture production for the domestic
market. This would increase, not decrease, timber
usage, and the externality would still remain in
place.
Political Realities
It is often argued that the U.S. and other
rich countries should use trade policy to force low-
and middle-income countries to preserve their
natural resources and to lower their pollution.
Many support this view because of competitive
issues, others because they believe that, short of
war, trade is the most effective leverage a country
has to force swift compliance from another country.
The first view is, in our opinion, mainly a
protectionist argument. To those who hold this
view, the holy grail is a level playing field, and
neither is obtainable. Although possessing the holy
grail might be desirable, world-wide harmonization
of production techniques, labor laws, and
environmental regulations is not; it would be utterly
distorting. Because complete harmonization is
unobtainable, protectionists can use this issue to
increase trade barriers (Bhagwati 1993b) and, as we
have argued above, harmonization would not be
environmentally optimal.
The latter argument is a much older one.
In the extreme, these policies have historically been
used in conjunction with warfare to conquer or
force concessions from the weaker party. For
example, trade sanctions were used effectively in
this country to influence the outcome of the Civil
War when the Union blockaded Confederate ports
and sealed off trade. Today, trade policy is still
used for similar and often noneconomic reasons,
Examples of sanctions and embargos continue to
proliferate.
Thus, trade policy is often used to force the
values of one country onto another. Since it is
common practice for the U.S. to use trade policy for
noneconomic reasons, it is not surprising that
environmental groups view trade policy as an
effective and appropriate tool to coerce a
noncomplying country to adhere to mandated
environmentaJ regulations,
We fully appreciate that the purpose of
most trade sanctions is not to address economic but
rather political issues, Arguing the merits of using102 Scale, Jr. and Fairchild: Trade Agreements, Competition, and the Environment: Gridlock at the Crossroad
trading policies for geopoliticspurposes is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, we do want to
comment on what economic theory has to say about
a rich country using trade policy to pressure another
less powerful country to address an environmental
externality.
Consider the small country discussed
above. Suppose the country refuses to correct the
externality in the timber market. What would be
the outcome if the U.S. increased tariffs against that
country? Would the externality be addressed
directly?
The first question is quite complex but the
answer to the second is that the externality would
still remain. In fact, the U.S. policy might have
little repercussion on the country. If the country’s
share of furniture exports in total world exports of
furniture were small, the most likely effect would be
a shift in trade flows but not necessarily a change in
trade volume. For example, another exporting
country might divert its exports from other countries
to the U.S., while the targeted country would
replace the exports diverted to the U.S.. The
unilateral decision by the U.S. to use trade policy to
alleviate the externality would be ineffective. An
example would be the U.S, grain embargo against
the USSR in response to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan (U.S. Department of Agriculture),
If the trade policy does have an effect, it
will cause production and consumption distortions
in the U.S. and the other country. It may or may
not save timber resources. If it were effective, the
price of the type of furniture exported by the
noncomplying country to the U,S. would increase.
This would stimulate increased production of this
type of furniture in the U.S. which would increase
U.S. timber demand, unless substitution away from
other types of furniture occurred. If the U.S., due
to a comparative disadvantage, used more timber in
producing this type of furniture than the small
country, world timber use could actuatly increase as
a result of the policy.
Pollution Source and Payment
Practionem and those familiar with
economic literature concerning pollution and
environmental externalities must be aware that we,
until now, have not made the distinction between
local pollution and global pollution. Examples of
local pollution are the pollution of a lake internal to
one county such as Lake Ockeechobee in the U.S.,
air pollution in Mexico City, or pesticide pollution
in Tennessee. Examples of global pollution are the
pollution of Lake Superior, acid rain in Canada
caused by factories in Gary, Indiana, and pesticide
pollution that enters the Rio Grrmde in the U.S. but
causes damage in Mexico. Externalities are also
often categorized in this manner.
A growing consensus in the international
community is that local pollution is a local problem,
and the international community has little
justification to exert pressure for these local
problems to be remedied. Global pollution is
treated differently. Many believe that the
international community should exert pressure and
punishment on countries producing global pollution.
Again, the general consensus seems to be that the
pollutor must pay to clean up global pollution.
Producers of local pollution would also bear the
cost of a restoration, but it is up to their discretion
whether or not local pollution is addressed,
We believe that the distinction between
local and global pollution is somewhat contrived.
Brazil’s burning of the rain forest deep in its own
territory could be considered local pollution,
especially if smoke from the burning is not reaching
other countries. However, the rain forests do more
than provide timber in that they convert carbon
dioxide into oxygen, act as a filtering system to
improve the quality of air, and are a deposito~ for
many different and unique species of plants and
animats. We believe that all pollution is and should
be considered global. What should be done depends
on the type of pollution, its impact, and the type of
environment in which it occurs. Less emphasis
should be placed on national borders to determine
whether or not and how pollution should be
handled,
We also believe that the “pollutor-should-
pay” rule does not lead to optimal, global
environmental quality, Even when a poor country
evaluates the cost of pollution according to its social
costs and according to its income level, an
externality may still exist in that it does not evaluate
it at the world’s social costs. This leads us to
conclude that rich nations should assist in paying
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citizens of richer countries value it more. Rich
countries should bear part of the cost of preserving
the rain forests wherever they are located, If rich
countries do not do so, poorer countries may be
unable, or rationally unwilling, to bear the cost of
bringing environmental quality up to the standards
desired by rich countries,
If the “pollutor-pays” prmciplc does not
lead to a globally optimal sohmon, what type of
institutions would? It has been suggested that
GATT become GATTE and be expanded to include
international environmental agreements, This may
improve the global environmental dialogue, but as
we argue above, if linked to trade, environmental
actions may not improve the environment,
We suggest a new institution be created
and named the World Envuonmental Bank (WEB).
It could be structured along the lines of the World
Bank where member countries contribute according
to their willingness @ abdity to pay, It should,
however, be separate from the World Bank with its
emphasis on development and growth for the same
reason it should be separate from GATT. Its
mission should be to deal directly with pollution and
environmental externalities, It should not just be a
regulatory body such as the Environmental
Protection Agency in the U.S., or a rules-clearing-
house such as GATT. WEB should use lts expertise
to identify environmental problems, evaluate
impacts and externalities, mobihze members to deal
with the problems, and use Its funds to help pay for
a remedy to the problems. If a country, such as
Costa Rica, were cutting its ram forest more than
what was globally desired, WEB should add its
flmds to those of Costa Rica to ensure that its min
forests were preserved at the globally-desired level,
A Southern Perspective on Trade and
Environmental Issues
Southern agriculture has a long, rich and
turbulent history of international trade. The
importance of international markets and the strong
ties between agriculture and the world economy
have been a fact of life for Southern agriculture for
over two hundred years. Conflicts over trade
restrictions associated with Southern commodities
were a major contributing factor to both the
American Revolution and the Civil War,
International trade has continued to provide vital
markets for Southern agricultural products, and U.S.
trade policy decisions have helped shape the
region’s agriculture (Paggi et al,),
Harris and Benson note that the South is
probably the most trade-oriented and trade-sensitive
region of the nation, As such, the South has a
sizable stake in international trade policy as well as
other governmental policies which affect the
region’s abihty to compete in both domestic and
export markets. The economic health of Southern
agriculture is dependent on specialty crops in which
the region has a production advantage based on
climatic conditions. These crops include tobacco,
cotton, rice, peanuts, sugarcane, citrus and other
fruits, certain vegetables, catfish and pine timber
(Harris and Benson). Thus, the ability to
successfully “Mm the weather” is vulnerable to
increased competition which is often the result of
international tmde agreements designed to create
more open trade.
Harris and Benson further note that for
many of the nationally produced commodities,
including food and feed grains and diary, much of
the Southern region represents marginal production,
Generally, production costs per unit of output arc
higher in the South. Therefore, these commodities
have been subject to significant production
adjustments in response to price changes, in
particular wheat and soybeans (IIarris and Benson).
The Southern region is both sensitive and
vulnerable to environmental policies which arc
Iinkcd to production and trade. Lower Icvels of soil
productivity and a more hostile production
environment result in situations in which viable
production systems depend on chemicals to a
relatively greater degree, Thus, the impact of
environmental policies may be greater in the
Southern region, particularly in sub-sectors
dependent on chemical inputs to achieve
economically viable production levels of acceptable-
quality output. The fruit and vegetable industries
provide dramatic examples (see Knutson et al,).
Being a producer of regional specialty
crops and a high-cost producer of many nationally-
grown commodities, Southern agriculture is
particularly sensitive to policy changes which result
in lower prices or higher costs of production,104 Scale, Jr, and Fazrchild: Trade Agreements, Competition, and lhe Environment: Gridlock at the Crossroad
processing and marketing. Therefore, many
producers in the region are vulnerable to forces that
change their ability to compete in domestic and
export markets. Both trade policies manifested
through trade agreements and environmental policies
articulated through government intervention are
major forces of change which are expected to
continue. Thus, potentially lower prices (at least in
the short run) associated with freer trade, combined
with higher costs associated with more restrictive
environmental regulations, create a link between
international trade, the environment and competition.
In addition, the trend towards utilization of
international trade agreements for environmental
policy purposes further strengthens the link.
We would argue that both U.S. and
Southern agriculture are at a crossroads composed
of international trade policies and environmental
policies. We have several concerns. First, it seems
that there are no speed limits as we approach this
intersection, and both policy paradigms seem to be
on a fast track. Second, it appears that there are no
stop signs at the crossroad, not to mention a traffic
light. While we are not necessarily predicting a
fatal collision for agriculture, the risk of a wreck is
certainly increasing. Third, as if the potential
impacts of these two policy forces on agriculture
were not enough to occupy our attention, the
attempts to use trade policy to achieve
environmental objectives, particularly with respect
to externalities, have created a gridlock at the
crossroad.
Concluding Remarks
We certainly acknowledge the existence of
environmental externalities associated with
production agriculture, both domestically and
internationally, but suggest that externalities may be
even less subject to quantification and measurement
than the economic impacts of proposed trade
agreements. We are not anti-environment and
applaud attempts to identify sources of pollution and
measure their impacts on the environment.
Externalities should be addressed with targeted
policies rather than broad or misdirected policies
which may create further distortions, Using
international trade policies and agreements to
address negative environmental externalities is not
an efficient approach.
Attempts to solve problems created by
negative environmental externalities through the use
of international trade policy should not come as a
surprise. Trade policy has been and continues to be
used by governments to accomplish political and
social, as well as, economic objectives. Examples
include sieges, sanctions and embargoes as noted
previously. Often, economic issues are not at the
core of the debate, but rather a peripheral
consideration.
The economic impacts on U.S. agriculture
or a specific sub-sector are often ignored or eclipsed
by larger political, social, or environmental
concerns. Moreover, agriculture remains one of the
most difficult sectors on which to reach agreement
in the international trade arena. The addition of
environmental constraints to international trade
agreements in an attempt to impose our
environmental values on other countries or to
achieve a “level playing field” would result in
eliminating the major benefits of trade.
We are entering an era of compromises
between commercial agriculture as it once was and
environmental policies based on an ideal world with
few economic realities. The outcome of these
compromises will change the face of agriculture as
we know it. These changes will have implications
for the economic viability and competitiveness of
some sub-sectors of U.S. agriculture. Further, the
use of international trade agreements to address the
environmental externalities associated with
agricultural production in other countries,
particularly in the Western Hemisphere, will likely
continue in the near term.
We agree that the total cost of resources
utilized in commercial agriculture should be
considered in determining costs. We also
understand the need to develop social optima to
guide environmental policy, but are concerned about
how this is accomplished. The process could be
enhanced if the total cost and impacts of
environmental rules and regulations were estimated
and publicized. An interesting test for the
appropriateness of estimated socially-optimal
environmental policies could be found in consumer
reaction to the abandonment of our long-standing
cheap food policy. Perhaps Joe Sixpack and his
cousin Bubba would be interested in the relationship
between government-determined social optima inJ. Agr, and Applied Econ., July, 1994
the environmental arena and the price of food in the
local grocery store.
While international trade agreements may
cause some stress for selected subsectors, it will be
environmental rules and regulations which put
agriculture at risk. However, we are not defending
agriculture, nor suggesting that it be immune from
economic or environmental realities. We are simply
suggesting that the full impact on producers,
consumers, and the environment of broadJy written
policies, with inflexible rules and regulations, be
estimated ex ante and that this information be
available to policy makers, regulators, and the
public.
We must bridge the widening gap which
exists in our profession between traditional
agricultural economists and naturat resource
economists on the subjects of environmental quality
and regulation. Since neither branch of our
profession has all of the answers and we are
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running out or time, we need to work together to
find answers to these critical questions.
We run the risk of standing on the sideline
and watching another major issue become a crisis,
with no meaningful input from economists. We
must get the divergent views within our profession
on the same page, if we are to be part of the
solution.
We doubt that there will be general
agreement, or even agreement within our profession,
on the best solution to the increasing gridlcck at the
crossroads between trade and environment, or even
on whether a solution exists. Our intention has
been to provide a perspective on the situation and
potentiat solutions. We believe that our profession
needs to sharply focus its attention on the gridlock.
The emerging crisis now visible in Southern
agriculture should serve as a wake-up call for all of
U.S. agriculture and the agricultural economics
profession.
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